Three Essays on Venture Capital Finance

Three Essays on Venture Capital Finance

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Title: Three Essays on Venture Capital Finance
Author: Peter, Jeffrey Scott Kobayahsi
Abstract: Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.
Date: 2011
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10393/20275
Supervisor: Tremblay, Jean-François
Faculty: Sciences sociales / Social Sciences
Degree: PhD

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